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Abstract
This study investigates how various types of pension reforms
affect the age-related policy preferences of different cohorts
and whether they reinforce or undermine the generational
welfare contract. It uses detailed descriptions from OECD
Pensions at a Glance reports to create indicators for pension
reforms in 18 European countries between 2008 and 2016.
These indicators are combined with European Social Survey
data from 2008 and 2016 to measure preferences towards
welfare programmes that benefit the old compared to poli-
cies that benefit the working population and families with
children. A difference-in-difference design is applied to test
whether there are differences between reform and non-
reform countries and between cohorts. Pension reforms
were found to be associated with stronger declines in pro-
old policy preferences in countries that raised the retirement
age or introduced private pensions. The results show that
although support for pro-old welfare policies has declined in
almost all countries, this has not necessarily undermined the
generational welfare contract. Rather, there has been a re-
balancing of preferences towards policies that also favour
other generations in other life-course stages.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Under the generational welfare contract, people support not only policies that favour themselves but also policies
that are beneficial to those in other stages of the life course (Birnbaum, Ferrarini, Nelson, & Palme, 2017). Pensions
and other ‘pro-old’ welfare policies rely perhaps more than others on the generational welfare contract
(Svallfors, 2008). Younger generations are willing to contribute to a system that will not benefit them until decades
later. In the current times of population ageing and permanent austerity, the generational welfare contract is under
mounting pressure. The erosion of intergenerational solidarity could lead to a vicious circle where the polarisation of
policy preferences between generations threatens to unbalance the generational welfare contract, increasing
inequalities across the life course, which, in turn, might lead to a further polarisation and undermining of the genera-
tional welfare contract.
The most obvious route to containing the costs of population ageing is through old-age pensions, which consti-
tute the largest welfare programme in all European countries (Kuitto, 2016; Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2013). Pension sys-
tems have been reformed in most countries in recent decades, but there are different types of reforms that can shift
the burden of population ageing onto different generations. If the benefits and costs of these reforms affect genera-
tions' perceptions of age-related social policies differently, then a particular type of pension reform might be used as
an instrument to improve not only public finances but also solidarity between generations. Although pension reforms
are rarely motivated by ambitions to reinforce the generational welfare contract, this may well be an important side-
effect and therefore warrants close consideration.
This article investigates whether different types of pension reforms potentially reinforce or undermine the gen-
erational welfare contract. It does so by examining the impact of the event of a reform on subsequent cohorts' pref-
erences for pro-old welfare policies. The concept of preferences for pro-old policies is operationalised as individuals'
support for government responsibility for providing a standard of living for the old as relative to their support for
government provision of childcare and a standard of living for the unemployed. The study hypothesises how various
pension reforms affect cohorts' preferences for pro-old welfare policies through policy feedback mechanisms
(Busemeyer, Abrassart, & Nezi, 2019). The empirical part of the study uses two rounds of cross-sectional data from
the European Social Survey (ESS) combined with information on pension reforms from OECD Pensions at a Glance
(PaG) reports to explore whether those reforms are associated with changes in consecutive cohorts' preferences for
a generational welfare contract that provides support for older people in society.
2 | THEORY AND BACKGROUND
2.1 | An eroding generational welfare contract?
In their recent book, Birnbaum et al. (2017) approach the generation welfare contract as the ‘ways in which welfare
state institutions address age-related social risks’ (p. 4). They identify three age-related social risks: childhood, work-
ing age and old age. Generational welfare contracts can be skewed to each type of risk, meaning that they can be
pro-child, pro-work and pro-old. The authors argue that for generational welfare contracts to be sustainable and
have productive and equitable outcomes, the welfare state needs to address all three age-related social risks in a bal-
anced manner.
In their preferences for age-related welfare policies, individuals can similarly be relatively pro-child, pro-work
and pro-old. Most people display simultaneous support for pro-child (e.g., public childcare), pro-work
(e.g., unemployment insurance) and pro-old policies (e.g., pensions), while preferences can be skewed towards a cer-
tain type of policies. If preferences become strongly skewed along generational lines, say the working population
prefers only pro-work policies while pensioners prefer only pro-old policies, there will be an intergenerational con-
flict in policy preferences. Although cross-sectional differences in age-related policy preferences between
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generations often are found to be small or insignificant (Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2020; Emery, 2012; Hess,
Naumann, & Steinkopf, 2017; Prinzen, 2015), population ageing and the pressure it is putting on limited welfare state
resources could alter policy preferences and increase generational cleavages (Naumann, 2017; Tepe &
Vanhuysse, 2009).
Age-related welfare preferences have been found to be largely influenced by the individual's gender, age and
class as well as by political ideology, and to stem to a certain extent from self-interest in social policies (Ahn &
Kim, 2014; Bonoli & Häusermann, 2009). This self-interest does not necessarily need to be short-term: even if peo-
ple do not currently benefit from certain policies, they might have benefited in the past or they, their parents, chil-
dren or grandchildren will benefit at some stage in their life (Busemeyer, Goerres, & Weschle, 2009; Busemeyer &
Neimanns, 2017; Fernández, 2013; Prinzen, 2015).
In addition to self-interest, people's policy preferences are shaped by norms, and they generally favour policies
for those who need and deserve the most (Prinzen, 2015; Svallfors, 2008; Van Oorschot, 2006). For example,
Fernández (2013) found that the demand for public pension provision increases when poverty rates among the old
are higher, while Ebbinghaus and Naumann (2020) showed that support for public pensions is higher when the needs
of pensioners are more pronounced. Moreover, provision of age-related policies should be perceived as proportional
and balanced. People often understand that the welfare state's resources are limited and that trade-offs need to be
made (Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017). However, too much spending on a single programme may incite opposition
among those not directly benefiting (Busemeyer & Neimanns, 2017). Finally, there must be trust that policies are sus-
tainable and that ‘welfare duties’ are reciprocated with ‘welfare rights’, now or in the future (Ahn & Kim, 2014;
Fernández, 2013).
2.2 | From reforms to preferences: The role of policy feedback effects
Preferences are also shaped by existing institutions and policies (Béland & Schlager, 2019; Busemeyer et al., 2019;
Busemeyer & Neimanns, 2017; Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2020). This suggests that if the welfare state's limited
resources can be directed or distributed in certain ways, it may be possible to avert intergenerational conflict or at
least to curtail its effects. Given the size and importance of pension systems in modern welfare states, there is an
incentive for policymakers to implement reforms in ways that are perceived to secure an equitable distribution of
the burden of population ageing among generations in order to keep preferences for the generational welfare con-
tract in balance.
Studies on the interactions between specific policies and policy changes at the macro level and attitudes and
preferences for those policies at the micro level often operationalise policies as aggregate spending in certain
domains (Ahn & Kim, 2014; Busemeyer & Neimanns, 2017; Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2020). There are two limitations
to this approach. First, it assumes that changes in spending are visible to the public and that changes in spending are
the outcome of a reform. The current study, however, focuses changes in preferences as a result of the event of the
legislation or introduction of a reform.
Second, Fernández and Jaime-Castillo (2013), Naumann (2017) and Hinrichs (2021) emphasise that retrench-
ment of pension expenditure per se is not a realistic policy option. Rather, it is important to look at pragmatic or
parametric pension reform options that are de facto on the political agenda. These include raising the retirement age,
increasing pension contributions, decreasing benefits and the marketisation, privatisation or multi-pillarisation of
pensions (Ebbinghaus, 2015; Hinrichs, 2021; Jaime-Castillo, 2013; Kuitto & Helmdag, 2021). As each of these
reforms redistributes the burden of population ageing differently among groups in society (Grech, 2015), it is possi-
ble that they have varying effects on the age-related policy preferences of consecutive generations.
Policy reform as an event can lead to changes in public attitudes and preferences through policy feedback
effects (Béland & Schlager, 2019). Often, a distinction is made between ‘positive’ or self-reinforcing feedback, where
the public approves of existing policies or reform trajectories (Pierson, 1993), and ‘negative’ or self-undermining
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feedback, where public opinion disapproves of and moves in the opposite direction of the reform (Wlezien &
Soroka, 2012). Busemeyer et al. (2019) argue that this dichotomy is too simplistic and offer a more multidimensional
framework that does justice to the time dimension, scope and direction of feedback effects. In the remainder of this
section, this framework is used to develop hypotheses of how pension reforms change policy preferences.
First, Busemeyer et al. (2019) distinguish between long-term institutional feedback and short-term dynamic
feedback effects from recent policy changes. Concerning pension reforms, the focus is on short-term dynamic feed-
back effects from recent policy changes. Still, preferences may be ‘sticky’ as they are shaped by national culture and
institutions, even if radical reforms take place. There is substantial cross-country variation in age cleavages in prefer-
ences for age-related redistributive spending (Busemeyer et al., 2009; Fernández, 2013; Lynch & Myrskylä, 2009).
Busemeyer et al. (2009) noted that these cleavages are more pronounced in countries that have minimalist welfare
states, where a large proportion of spending tends to target the old, especially in the form of pensions. Moreover,
budget competition between age groups is likely to be stronger in minimalist welfare states (Ahn & Kim, 2014;
Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017). Countries that are predominantly pro-old in their welfare spending will be more
vulnerable to intergenerational conflict due to the disproportional effects of population ageing on welfare spending
(Birnbaum et al., 2017; Esping-Andersen & Sarasa, 2002).
Second, the extent or scope of the feedback can be ‘general’, that is, the effect of an entire welfare state or
regime on individual preferences, or ‘specific’, that is, the effect of particular policies or policy changes on the atti-
tudes towards those policies. Instead of analysing the specific policy feedback effects of certain reforms on attitudes
towards those reforms (see, e.g., Fernández & Jaime-Castillo, 2013; Naumann, 2014; Naumann, 2017), the current
study investigates how reform affects more general preferences for policies that benefit the old. These general pref-
erences do not necessarily change through approval or disapproval of the reform itself, but because the policy
change strengthens or weakens perceptions of self-interest or norms of deservingness, proportionality and trust in
reciprocity.
Third, Busemeyer et al. (2019) identify three possible directions of feedback. ‘Self-reinforcing’ suggests support
for continued provision of a policy, while ‘accelerating’ feedback indicates support for its expansion. The term ‘self-
undermining’ feedback is used for policies that create opposition to their continued provision. Retrenching pension
reforms are commonly unpopular (Lynch & Myrskylä, 2009; Naumann, 2017) and likely to generate self-undermining
feedback. It can be expected to translate into changes in preferences for pro-old policies in two opposing ways,
depending on whether the reform addresses pension rights or pension duties (Ahn & Kim, 2014). If rights are
infringed, for example, access to adequate pension benefits or early retirement are restricted, it is likely that this is
countered by a higher demand for compensatory pro-old policies. However, if a reform reinforces duties, for exam-
ple, by raising costs, it is more likely that individuals oppose further expansion of pro-old policies or favour a
reduction.
On the other hand, positive feedback (both self-reinforcing and accelerating) is also possible if a reform is wel-
comed as improving an individual's own position or as corresponding with the individual's norms of deservingness,
proportionality and trust in the government's provision of a standard of living for the old. As a result, individuals may
moderate their preferences for pro-old policies and shift their preferences towards policies that benefit other demo-
graphics as well.
It should be noted that pension systems are relatively complex and reforms can be difficult for the general
public to understand (Busemeyer et al., 2019, p. 23). Therefore, the effects of reforms on policy preferences may
be small or non-existent, especially if the reform remains rather invisible or its effects intangible in the short run.
For example, indexing pension benefits or contributions is a relatively technical procedure that may easily go
unnoticed to the public (Weaver, 2010). However, it is possible that some types of reforms attract more atten-
tion and debate, such as raising the retirement age or pension privatisation. In the latter case, the introduction of
multi-pillarisation to pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems may be a path-breaking reform. People tend to prefer the
pension system that they know and react more strongly to paradigmatic changes (Van Groezen, Kiiver, &
Unger, 2009).
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2.3 | Varieties of pension reforms and changing policy preferences
Reforms to raise the retirement age create a need to work longer before reaching pension entitlement. This may
lead to self-undermining feedback among the working-age population, as their right to retire at an earlier age is
infringed. Particularly older workers might feel that the finish line is moved just as they were getting close
(Bütler, 2002; Litwin, Achdut, & Youssim, 2009). This can result in an increasing preference for pro-old policies. On
the other hand, among younger workers for whom retirement is still a long way off, it is possible that the reform
will increase a sense of sustainability of the system and, therefore, lead to positive feedback effects on prefer-
ences. Raising the retirement age is potentially welcomed by current pensioners and may lead to positive feedback
effects, as the reform will decrease the number of retirees with whom they share their pension benefits
(Naumann, 2014).
Hypothesis 1. Reforms that raise the retirement age increase preferences for pro-old policies among older workers,
but moderate preferences for pro-old policies among younger workers and retirees.
Increases in pension contributions likely result in self-undermining feedback among the working-age population.
After all, it is they who have to foot the higher bill (Bay & West-Pedersen, 2004). The reform may also induce feel-
ings of disproportionality and injustice. In this case, the reform's self-undermining feedback might lead to lower pref-
erences for pro-old policies, as workers see those policies as the direct cause of the increased costs (Ahn &
Kim, 2014). Older workers, nevertheless, have better prospects of seeing those contributions translated into benefits
and prefer the government to keep up the standard of living for the old. Increases in contributions can lead to posi-
tive feedback effects among current pensioners, if those increases sustain or improve benefit levels.
Hypothesis 2. Reforms that increase contributions reduce preferences for pro-old policies among younger workers
and retirees, but reinforce preferences for pro-old policies among older workers.
As pensioners are generally considered ‘deserving’ welfare recipients (Prinzen, 2015; Van Oorschot, 2006) and
perceived need and poverty among old-age pensioners invokes greater preferences for higher pensions
(Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2020; Fernández, 2013), the self-undermining feedback effect of lowering benefits may be
present across generations. Among older workers, a lowering of benefits could have an additional self-undermining
feedback, as they soon retire and receive lower benefits than anticipated. Obviously, current pensioners will lose the
most if their benefits are lowered, although in many countries legislation shields the rights and benefits of current
pensioners from reforms.
Hypothesis 3. Reforms that lower pension benefits increase preferences for pro-old policies among all generations,
but especially among older workers and pensioners.
Studies have suggested that younger workers are generally more in favour of private pensions (Boeri, Boersch-
Supan, & Tabellini, 2002; Van Groezen et al., 2009). Younger generations have more time to accrue a larger private
pension. Moreover, if private funded pensions replace public PAYG pensions, they weaken intergenerational trans-
fers (Ebbinghaus, 2015). Pension privatisation or multi-pillarisation can be a signal to the younger generation that it
is not the government's responsibility to support older generations. Therefore, self-reinforcing or accelerating effects
of pension multi-pillarisation on pro-old welfare preferences can be expected especially among younger age groups.
On the other hand, it is possible that multi-pillarisation creates greater uncertainty about future benefits, especially if
accompanied with a shift from defined benefits to defined contributions. This may have a self-undermining feedback
effect. As the introduction of new private pension schemes usually does not affect the pensions of current or soon-
to-be retirees, it is unclear whether it changes their preferences.
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Hypothesis 4a. Pension multi-pillarisation reduces preferences for pro-old policies among the younger workforce
(the ‘diminishing intergenerational solidarity hypothesis’).
Hypothesis 4b. Pension multi-pillarisation reinforces preferences for pro-old policies among the younger workforce
(the ‘future uncertainty hypothesis’).
3 | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Individual-level data
Rounds 4 (2008) and 8 (2016) of the ESS contain relevant rotating modules on welfare attitudes, from which the
dependent variables were drawn. The countries included in this study were selected based on their participation in
both rounds. Moreover, they had to be included in the relevant sections of OECD Pensions at a Glance (PaG) reports
(OECD, 2013, 2015, 2017). This restricted the selection to 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, this selection provides a good balance of geographical regions
and welfare state regimes.
3.2 | Dependent variable
ESS rounds, 4 and 8, include a variable where respondents are asked to say to what extent a country's government
should be responsible for ensuring ‘a reasonable standard of living for the old’, where 0 means that it should not be
the government's responsibility at all and 10 means that it should be entirely the government's responsibility. To cre-
ate an indicator of preference for pro-old welfare policies, support for government responsibility for the old is com-
pared with two items that measure support for government responsibility in ensuring a reasonable standard of living
for the unemployed and government responsibility in ensuring sufficient childcare services. Both items are similarly
rated from 0 to 10 and available in both survey rounds. The relative measure of pro-old welfare policy preference
was calculated as the preference for government responsibility in ensuring a standard of living for the old, minus the
average of preferences for government responsibility in ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed
and sufficient childcare services.
This relative operationalisation of pro-old welfare policy preferences was chosen over an absolute mea-
sure for several reasons. Used separately, these items entail a high probability that someone with a strong
preference for one type of government policy displays similarly strong support for other types of welfare pro-
vision (Emery, 2012; Hess et al., 2017; Prinzen, 2015). When they are used in combination, pro-old policy pref-
erences are operationalised as relative to preferences for typical pro-child and pro-work policies. The
distribution of the pro-old policy preference variable is close to normal, albeit with a high concentration of
values around zero, that is, balanced preferences for government responsibility for pensions, unemployment
benefits and childcare.
Furthermore, this measure incorporates several other dimensions of public attitudes towards welfare policies.
Attitudes towards government provision of unemployment benefits and childcare represent preferences towards
policies that are typically ‘old’ passive social transfers and ‘new’ social investment, respectively (Busemeyer &
Garritzmann, 2017; Busemeyer & Neimanns, 2017; Kuitto, 2016). Moreover, preferences for both pension policies
and childcare are characterised by high levels of ‘deservingness’, whereas unemployment benefits usually score low
on the deservingness factor (Svallfors, 2008; Van Oorschot, 2006).
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3.3 | Individual-level independent variables
This study restricts the analysis to the same cohorts in 2008 and 2016 and follows them as they age. Whereas attitu-
dinal change over time is more likely to happen as a result of generational replacement (Busemeyer et al., 2019,
p. 11), we are primarily interested in whether the same cohorts can change their preferences following a reform. In
the words of Esping-Andersen and Sarasa (2002, p. 9), ‘some cohorts are historically lucky, others less so’,
emphasising the importance of time of birth and the institutions and societal norms that were influential at various
stages of the earlier life course (Prinzen, 2015).
The main individual-level independent variable for cohort distinguishes those born in the years 1979–1993,
1964–1978, 1949–1963 and 1934–1949. This means that the youngest cohort was 15–29 years of age in 2008 and
includes mainly students and labour market entrants. Those born between 1964 and 1978 were aged 30–44 in 2008
and are assumed to be in the career-making and family formation phases of their lives. Starting from the age of
45, workers are often considered already ‘old’. These workers may already be looking forward to or planning their
retirement. Finally, the oldest cohort was aged between 60 and 74 in 2008 (cohort 1934–1948). Although pension
ages and possibilities for early retirement differ by country, by the age of 60 most people will be moving into retire-
ment or intend to retire soon.
Controls were introduced for gender, marital status and having children (no children, children in the household
or children but not in the household). Being married and having children may lower preferences for pro-old welfare
policies and increase preferences for pro-child welfare. To control for socio-economic status, variables for level of
education (lower, intermediate or higher), labour market status (employed, self-employed, unemployed/sick/disabled,
retired or other) and subjective economic well-being (difficult to cope on current income, yes or no) were included.
The latter was used as a dichotomous proxy for income because of the great number of missing values in the dispos-
able household income variable. Finally, a variable, measuring interest in politics (yes or no), was included to control
for the possibility that politically interested people are more likely to follow pension policies in more detail. Summary
statistics for each of the variables by cohort and survey year are presented in Table 1.
3.4 | Reform indicators
Information from three consecutive OECD PaG reports was used to construct indicators for different types of
reforms (OECD, 2013, 2015, 2017). These reports include detailed descriptions of the reforms that have taken place
in the pension systems of OECD member countries between 2009 and 2017. Based on these descriptions, dummies
were created for four types of pragmatic pension reforms in response to population ageing: raising the retirement
age, increasing pension contributions, lowering pension benefits and reducing coverage of public pension insurance
or expanding private pension provision. It should be noted that, in some countries, reforms moved in the opposite
direction during this period. Especially countries hit hardest by the Great Recession experimented with measures
such as re-collectivising private pension pillars to boost public finances and decreasing pension contributions to
boost employment (Hinrichs, 2015). Such reforms are not accounted for in the analysis.
The online technical Appendix includes descriptions from the PaG reports of all the reforms that were identified
as relevant to this study. Reforms were included if they were implemented before the end of 2016. Although data
for ESS round 8 were gathered earlier, it is assumed that the legislative process was on-going and visible to the pub-
lic at the time of surveying. A reform was classified as raising the retirement age if there is mention of increasing the
pensionable age for men, women or both. This can be an immediate change affecting soon-to-retire workers or an
incremental change that will only be relevant for younger cohorts. Reforms to reduce benefits included instances
where the cuts would come into effect immediately or within a relatively short period of time; the introduction of
price or wage indexing; and the introduction of a life expectancy correction term. Changes in taxes that de facto
increase contributions or decrease benefits were also counted as relevant reforms. Multi-pillarisation reforms were
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classified as such if they included the marketisation or privatisation of (parts of) pension schemes
(Ebbinghaus, 2015).
Table 2 summarises the occurrence of these types of reforms by country. It shows that the most common reform
during the observation period was raising the retirement age. Increasing contributions, decreasing benefits and reducing
public coverage occurred in only 5, 8 and 5 out of the 18 countries, respectively. Table 2 also shows that the reform
packages, that is, combinations of reform types, differed by country. A measure for the intensity of reform indicates that
none of the countries introduced all four types of reforms. Sweden introduced no relevant reforms at all.
3.5 | Analytical strategy
Following descriptive analysis and OLS regression to explore the association of the independent and control vari-
ables with the response variable, a quasi-experimental difference-in-difference (DID) approach was used to estimate
the impact of each type of reform on preferences for pro-old welfare policies in each cohort. In DID, a distinction is
made between a treatment group (in this case, countries that introduced a type of reform between 2008 and 2016)
and a control group (countries without such reform). The outcome variable was measured in both groups before
(2008, t = 0) and after the treatment (2016, t = 1). In the regression models, while controlling for initial differences
between the treatment and control groups and overall time-effects of t = 0 and t = 1, an interaction of a treatment









2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016
Women 50.7 50.6 52.5 52.9 50.9 49.8 49.9 50.9
Education Low 34.4 13.8 19.4 20.0 26.9 29.3 42.8 42.3
Intermediate 47.7 50.3 48.9 51.0 47.0 49.2 38.8 39.9
High 17.9 35.9 31.7 28.9 26.1 21.5 18.4 17.9
Labour market
status
Employed 41.4 64.7 66.0 67.8 59.2 39.8 10.3 1.9
Self-employed 3.3 8.3 11.2 13.6 14.0 10.0 4.9 1.9
Unemployed, sick,
disabled
7.8 9.0 7.9 9.4 9.9 9.6 4.0 0.9
Retired 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 6.9 32.3 69.2 88.5
Other 47.3 17.7 14.5 8.5 9.9 8.3 11.5 6.8
Difficult to cope
with income
17.7 14.4 20.1 18.3 18.6 16.5 17.8 12.8
Married 14.2 38.4 65.5 66.3 71.2 70.9 70.9 66.3
Children No of children 85.1 53.4 25.4 16.6 15.8 15.5 16.8 14.3
Children living in the
household
13.1 42.8 69.3 70.5 54.7 31.3 17.7 11.0
Children, but not living
in the household
1.9 3.8 5.3 12.9 29.5 53.3 65.6 74.8
Interested in
politics
37.3 46.7 48.1 52.2 55.7 59.7 58.4 61.3
N 7,557 7,503 9,135 8,646 9,060 8,860 7,020 5,435
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dummy with a t = 1-dummy should indicate whether the reform had a significant effect on the outcome variable. As
the main interest goes out to the effect of the reforms on differences in preferences between cohorts, three-term
interactions were included for treatment, time and cohort. This can be referred to as a difference-in-difference-in-
difference approach.
Some caveats apply. It should be noted that the treatment dummy was not included in the analysis on its own,
but only in the interactions with the time and cohort dummies. This was done because country dummies were
included in the models to account for unobserved variance between countries (Möhring, 2012). This approach was
chosen to control for the substantial differences between national contexts. Country dummies absorb all inter-
country differences, including for belonging to the control and treatment groups. For reforms that were found to
have a significant impact, margins were plotted. These also show the initial differences between control and treat-
ment countries. Finally, it should be noted that, in this specific research setting, it is not strictly possible to identify
causal effects, as it uses repeated cross-sectional data, not panel data.
4 | FINDINGS
4.1 | Descriptive analysis
Figure 1 shows how preferences for pro-old welfare policies changed in the 18 countries included in this study. Pref-
erences clearly declined between 2008 and 2016 in all countries except Israel and Austria. Relative preferences



















Finland X X X 3
France X X X 3
Ireland X X 2
Israel X X 2
Netherlands X X 2
Norway X 1
Poland X X 2
Portugal X X X 3
Slovenia X 1






Total 12 7 8 5 32
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dropped most considerably in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Poland, the Czech Republic and Norway. These
decreases cannot be explained only by a decline in support for government policies for the old, but also by increased
preference for other age-related welfare policies, especially childcare (see Figures S1–S3 in the online Appendix).
The results confirm that in liberal or minimal welfare states, like the United Kingdom, Israel and Ireland, preference
for pro-old welfare was and remained the highest. Larger and more social-investment oriented welfare states such as
Finland, Norway and Germany displayed the smallest pro-old bias in welfare policy preferences.
Table 3 shows the average levels of preference for pro-old welfare policies by country and cohort. In most coun-
tries, preference levels in 2008 were highest among the oldest cohorts and lowest among the youngest. The picture
for 2016 is more mixed. In most countries, pro-old policy preferences declined among all cohorts, but the strongest
decline was found among the oldest cohorts. Preferences for pro-old welfare policies increased in all four cohorts in
only one country, Israel.
4.2 | Regression analysis
Table 4 shows the results for the OLS regression analysis of preferences for pro-old welfare policies. The R-squared
of the empty model with only country dummies indicates that 7.6% of the variance in the dependent variable can be
explained by country of residence. Considering that in the full model R-squared reaches only 8.9%, it appears that
factors at the country level considerably shape preferences for pro-old welfare policies. The controls in Model 1 indi-
cate that women, those with higher education and those who are interested in politics have an overall lower prefer-
ence for pro-old welfare policies. Those who are employed and self-employed have a higher preference for pro-old
welfare, even higher than retirees. Subjective income, marital status and having children show no statistically signifi-
cant effects.
Table 4 confirms that initially pro-old preferences were highest among the oldest cohort and lowest among the
youngest. Looking at changes occurring between 2008 and 2016, the dummy for the year 2016 indicates a decline
in the preference for pro-old welfare policies. The interaction term coefficients confirm that there was no inter-
generational divergence of preferences, but that there seems to be convergence between cohorts, especially due to
a decline among the oldest cohorts.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 shows that introducing reforms was associated with a reduced preference for pro-old welfare policies,
except in the case of decreasing benefits. However, the coefficients of the interactions between the year and reform
dummies were statistically significant only for raising the retirement age and multi-pillarisation reforms. In the former
case, Figure 2 shows that there were no substantial changes in preferences among any of the cohorts in the group of
non-reform countries (Austria, Israel, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland). Figure 3 shows a strong down-
ward convergence in the preferences of countries that introduced or reinforced multi-pillarisation (Austria, Belgium,
Czech Republic, Israel and Poland) towards the levels in non-reform countries. This decline in preferences was driven
especially by declines in Poland, the Czech Republic and Belgium, whereas Israel showed an opposite trend towards
greater preference for pro-old welfare policies (see also Figure 1 and Table 3). In addition, Model 6 in Table 5 indi-
cates that the greater the number of reforms introduced, the greater the decrease in preference for pro-old policies.
In Table 5, interaction terms of the year and reform dummies with the cohort dummies are included to analyse
the impact of reforms on pro-old welfare policy preferences among specific cohorts. The results show that reforms
had only minor impact on cohort differences in policy preferences, as almost all three-way interaction terms are non-
significant. However, in the case of countries raising the retirement age, the oldest cohort's preference for pro-old
welfare declined more than among the same cohorts in the control group (Model 2 in Table 5 and Figure 2). In the
case of pension privatisation reforms, the cohort of older workers born in 1949–1963 displayed a relatively smaller
TABLE 4 OLS regression, preference for pro-old welfare policies
1
Female (ref. Male) −0.062** (0.022)
Education (ref. Lower) Intermediate 0.029 (0.029)
Higher −0.196*** (0.032)




Difficult to cope with income (ref. Not difficult) 0.013 (0.030)
Married (ref. Not married) −0.036 (0.025)
Children (ref. No children) Children living in household −0.016 (0.031)
Children, but not living in household 0.006 (0.036)
Interested in politics (ref. Not interested) −0.063** (0.023)
Cohort (ref. 1964–1978) 1979–1993 −0.104* (0.045)
1949–1963 0.078* (0.040)
1934–1948 0.209*** (0.053)
Year 2016 (ref. 2008) −0.249*** (0.040)
Cohort 1979–1993 × 2016 0.080 (0.059)
Cohort 1949–1963 × 2016 −0.009 (0.057)
Cohort 1934–1948 × 2016 −0.243*** (0.064)
Constant 0.957*** (0.057)
R2 empty model 0.076
R2 full model 0.089
N 61,246
Note: Reported are coefficients, SE between brackets. Country-fixed effects included, but not reported.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































decline in preferences for pro-old welfare policies than their peers in non-reform countries (Model 5 in Table 5 and
Figure 3).
Figures 2 and 3 also show the selection bias of belonging to the treatment group, which could not be controlled
for with a treatment group dummy in the OLS regression models. Countries that introduced reforms initially had
higher levels of preference for pro-old welfare policies and converged to the levels of non-reform countries.
Although there is some overlap between the countries that introduced reforms to raise the pensionable age and pri-
vatise pensions, it should be noted that these are two different sets of countries. As Table 2 showed, retirement ages
were raised in 12 countries, while privatisation took place in only five. Among countries that introduced or reinforced
private pillars, Austria and Israel did not further raise their retirement ages. Among the countries raising retirement
F IGURE 2 Margins with 95% confidence intervals for raising retirement age and preferences for pro-old welfare
policies by cohort, year and incidence of reform (based on Model 2 in Table 5)
F IGURE 3 Margins with 95% confidence intervals for multi-pillarisation and preferences for pro-old welfare
policies by cohort, year and incidence of reform (based on Model 5 in Table 5)
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ages, only Belgium, the Czech Republic and Poland introduced or reinforced private pension pillars during the same
period.
To check the robustness of these results, the same analyses were performed with the pro-old welfare policy
indicator as compared to preferences for childcare only and unemployment only separately (Table S1 in the online
Appendix). Women and those with children preferred childcare to support the old but displayed lower support for
unemployment benefits. Those who were unemployed, sick or disabled had a strong preference for unemployment
benefits. Younger cohorts were more pro-childcare in their welfare orientations, whereas older cohorts were more
pro-unemployed. Both variations on the dependent variable show a decline between 2008 and 2016, with the stron-
gest decline among the oldest cohort. Tables S2 and S3 show similar effects for the various reforms. In these models
too, the greatest effect is exerted by reforms introducing multi-pillarisation, yet with the two oldest cohorts being
less affected in their preferences.
5 | DISCUSSION
This study investigated the association between different types of pension reform and preferences for pro-old wel-
fare policies in Europe between 2008 and 2016. One of its main concerns was to analyse whether the design of pen-
sion reforms can reinforce or mitigate preferences for such policies among different generations. It used an
innovative research design with reform indicators based on OECD PaG reports combined with two rounds of survey
data. The results contribute to the rare literature on pension reforms and changes in welfare attitudes across time
(Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2020; Lynch & Myrskylä, 2009; Naumann, 2014).
In line with previous studies, the national institutional setting emerged as one of the strongest predictors of pol-
icy preferences (Busemeyer et al., 2009; Fernández & Jaime-Castillo, 2013; Goerres & Tepe, 2010; Lynch &
Myrskylä, 2009). This finding confirms the importance of long-term institutional feedback effects (Busemeyer
et al., 2019). The results showed that support for pro-old policies declined in most European countries, although
absolute support for government provision of a reasonable standard of living for the old remained high. Decreases in
relative preferences for pro-old policies were due not only to decreases in absolute support, but also to increases
especially in support for government provision of childcare. This indicates that while the generational welfare con-
trast may not be under any immediate threat, age-related policy preferences are certainly being re-calibrated in many
countries.
The results showed signs of cohort convergence in preferences for pro-old policies rather than growing inter-
generational conflict. Whereas in 2008, the oldest cohort had the highest preference for pro-old welfare policies, by
2016 this preference had declined to levels similar to those in the younger cohorts or even lower. The youngest
cohort showed no change or even a small increase in pro-old welfare policy preferences between 2008 and 2016.
This absence of growing intergenerational conflict is in line with other studies (Busemeyer et al., 2009; Ebbinghaus &
Naumann, 2020; Emery, 2012; Hess et al., 2017).
Rather than pursuing any single type of reform package, countries chose different reform trajectories to adjust
their specific pension systems. Support for pro-old welfare policies declined to a greater degree in countries that
raised the retirement age and increased multi-pillarisation compared to countries where such reforms were absent.
Studies have found that increases to the retirement age are particularly liable to raise opposition, possibly due to
feelings of injustice (Bütler, 2002; Litwin et al., 2009). In the case of pension privatisation, the reform may signal that
providing a reasonable standard of living is no longer the government's responsibility and, therefore, their prefer-
ences will shift to other policies. It is likely that both types of reforms have attracted more public exposure and
debate than changes in pension contributions and benefits. The latter types of reform are often more complex or
take effect incrementally; indexation is a case in point.
At the same time, countries where reforms raised the retirement age and introduced multi-pillarisation had, on
average, higher levels of preference for pro-old welfare policies in 2008. As a result, preferences converged between
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reform and non-reform countries. One possible explanation is that these reform countries are in fact latecomers.
Countries like Germany and Sweden had implemented their more far-reaching pension reforms before 2008, which
possibly explains their lower levels of initial support.
The results lend only partial support to the main hypotheses of the study that, due to short-term dynamic feed-
back effects, different types of reform affect the policy preferences of younger and older generations in different
ways. In line with Hypothesis 1, the oldest cohort showed the greatest decline in pro-old welfare preferences in coun-
tries that raised the retirement age. This is somewhat counter-intuitive as the oldest cohort predominantly consisted
of people who were already retired and, therefore, not directly affected by the reform. However, this may be the result
of a self-undermining feedback effect: pensioners accept that raising the retirement age is legitimate (Fernández &
Jaime-Castillo, 2013), resulting in a shift towards preferences for the provision of other age-related social policies. In
contrast to expectations, increasing contributions did not statistically significantly moderate preferences for pro-old
welfare policies in the working-age population (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, it was expected that reforms to decrease
benefits will increase preferences for pro-old welfare policies among older workers and pensioners in particular
(Hypothesis 3), but no differences between cohorts in reform and non-reform countries were found.
There was support for neither Hypotheses 4a nor 4b: the association of multi-pillarisation with pro-old policy
preferences of younger workers was not different than for other cohorts. However, older workers born in
1949–1963 showed a statistically significantly smaller decline in preferences for pro-old welfare policies following
pension privatisation than their peers in non-reform countries. This effect might be due to older workers' pensions
being less affected by the introduction of private pensions than younger workers' (Ebbinghaus & Naumann, 2020).
However, it is also possible that this is a self-undermining feedback effect and that the uncertainty created by the
reform affected older workers preferences rather than those of younger workers (Hypothesis 4b).
There are several limitations to this study. Although it moves beyond studies that use government spending as
an indicator of policy change, the use of reform dummies is not unproblematic. Whereas extreme care was taken in
the categorisation of reforms based on the PaG reports, some of the classifications may be subject to discussion.
The classifications did not consider the timing of the reform. A reform that took place in 2009 might have been for-
gotten by 2016, whereas changes introduced in 2015 will still have been fresh in people's minds. Moreover, the
reform's effects might take long to be felt.
Furthermore, although knowledge, self-interest and norms play a role in shaping age-related policy preferences
(Fernández, 2013; Goerres & Tepe, 2010; Prinzen, 2014, 2015), the data and analytical approach did not allow
directly controlling for this. More research is needed on the mediating role of knowledge of pension systems, self-
interest and norms. At the macro level, this study did not directly account for the Great Recession that took place
between 2008 and 2016 and pushed certain countries into fast and far-reaching reforms without seeking public
approval (Hinrichs, 2015).
Nevertheless, this study provides new insights into the links between pension reform design, the generational
welfare contract and inequalities across the life course. The sustainability of the pension system depends not only on
the ability of governments and society to finance the system, but also on the willingness of subsequent generations
to continue to do so. As confidence in the pension system diminishes, people who can afford to do so will search
other ways to ensure their retirement income; for instance, through private savings or life insurances. As the results
showed, pension privatisation may be particularly detrimental to support for government provision of old-age secu-
rity, especially by making the younger generation less amenable to redistribute to the old (Ebbinghaus, 2015). The
findings also suggest that policymakers should consider the public exposure given to reforms and inform the public
about their consequences.
At the same time, a well-functioning generational welfare contract is not only about providing welfare to the
old. This study indicated that relative preferences for policies that support the working population and those with
children have increased in many countries. Social investment in policies that support (women's) employment and chil-
dren's development will be much needed in the foreseeable future. A re-balancing of the generational welfare con-
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